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Abstract 
 
Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, 
strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was 
repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to 
either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly 
commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash 
play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly 
commit to actions. 
Keywords: coordination, cheap-talk, deception, indefinitely repeated game, social norms 
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1. Introduction 
Communication has a positive connotation in economics. Behavioral economists have 
shown that non-binding pre-play communication can be a powerful tool to coordinate actions 
and to promote welfare in social dilemmas (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992). This study 
is an experiment on if and how communication can promote the emergence of social norms 
of cooperation when subjects do not know the reputation of others. It examines the use of 
several communication technologies as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on 
Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to build trust by credibly committing to 
actions. 
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Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy, Phone: +39-051-2098135, Fax: +39-051-0544522, maria.bigoni@unibo.it. 
We thank Matthias Sutter and seminar participants at ESA Tucson 2010 and University of Innsbruck for useful 
comments. Financial support for the experiments was provided by Purdue’s CIBER. This draft was completed 
while G. Camera was visiting the University of Siena as a Fulbright scholar. 
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There exists an experimental literature that has explored the role of cheap-talk as a tool to 
signal intentions. The focus has been largely on two distinct issues: how communication can 
help to solve coordination problems (e.g., Cooper, et al. 1992 or, more recently, Blume and 
Ortmann, 2007), and how it can behaviorally discourage opportunism to improve outcomes in 
social dilemmas (e.g., Ostrom, 2000 or, more recently, Strassmair and Sutter, 2009). The 
present study makes several contributions. First, it analyzes communication when subjects’ 
interaction was indefinitely repeated. The stage game was a prisoner’s dilemma. Its repetition 
induced multiple equilibria ranging from full defection to the efficient outcome (folk 
theorem). This raises the issue of coordination along with the issue of opportunism. These 
issues present formidable obstacles to efficiency, from an empirical standpoint (Camera and 
Casari, 2009, Duffy and Ochs, 2009). Second, the design adopted makes it transparent that 
communication can be used in two opposing ways: as a coordination device, for those who 
are motivated by long-run efficiency, and as a tool for deception, for those who are tempted 
by short-run gains. Other types of experiments are less appropriate to study deception. For 
example, in coordination games there is no incentive to misrepresent intentions, even when 
there is conflict of interest (e.g., battle of the sexes). Moreover, cooperative messages should 
not be credible in finitely repeated social dilemmas because, among self-interested agents, 
only defection is consistent with equilibrium. In contrast, in our design, though subjects are 
constantly tempted by defection, cooperation is also part of equilibrium. 
This study reports that some forms of structured communication had a negative impact on 
cooperation, even if the efficient outcome was an equilibrium. This result is novel and can be 
ascribed to the conflicting short and long-run incentives confronting the subjects.  
A second contribution of the present study is the analysis of how communication through 
public statements impacts on social norms. In the experiment, an economy comprised a stable 
population of four subjects who interacted in pairs with changing opponents. A subject 
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initially shared a message with everyone else in the economy, observed everyone’s messages, 
and then randomly met an opponent. Before playing the prisoners’ dilemma, subjects could 
observe past cooperation rates in the economy but not individual histories. In our setup 
communication could be especially valuable in implementing a social norm leading to the 
efficient outcome because building a reputation is impossible. This design resembles the 
interaction that takes place in societies where due to a variety of reasons people may not 
know each other and may not trust each other.  In the field, transactions with these features 
are becoming more ubiquitous and designing decision mechanisms that can govern them is 
increasingly important (Baumann, 2000). 
The experiment included treatments to investigate the impact of a variety of 
communication formats on the outcomes achieved, including free-form and structured 
communication. We report that structured communication did not help cooperation, relative 
to a no-communication setting. A possible reason for this effect is deception, i.e., the 
opportunity for subjects to misrepresent their intentions.1 Our design makes it easy to detect 
and quantify deception in communication because subjects could make a neutral public 
statement instead of an explicit statement of cooperation or defection, thus deception was 
always intentional. 
To investigate whether deception undermines the usefulness of communication, we 
included a treatment where messages could form binding public promises of future play. By 
introducing the possibility of auditing, the design made voluntary commitment feasible, so 
that a message basically amounted to a credible pledge. The surprising result is that 
cooperation decreased compared to no-communication. 
                                                             
1 Aumann (1990) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) suggest credibility of messages is key to effective 
communication. 
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A main lesson is that structured communication does allow players to convey information 
about intended play, but it is also prone to a deceptive use, which destroys trust in the 
cooperative efforts of others. Another lesson from the experiment is that subjects did 
recognize and actively sought to solve the problem of deception through auditing. Yet, this 
did not raise the effectiveness of communication in sustaining social norms of cooperation. A 
third lesson is that public statements regarding intended play were not always effective in 
promoting cooperation even when full cooperation was an equilibrium. Why was structured 
communication ineffective? In the experiment cooperative messages were mostly perceived 
as a truthful signal of the senders’ cooperative intentions. In addition, subjects cooperated 
more when they saw more cooperative messages. The drawback is that this also increased the 
temptation to behave opportunistically: hence, some subjects exploited communication by 
disguising themselves as cooperators and then defected. The resulting coexistence of truthful 
and deceptive uses of communication diluted the effectiveness of making public statements 
of cooperation as a way to coordinate on efficient Nash play. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses related works; Section 3 presents the 
experimental design and offers theoretical considerations; results are reported in Section 4; 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section we review some recent experiments about communication that involve 
either coordination games or social dilemmas.2 Blume and Ortmann (2007) study finitely 
repeated coordination games, where a fixed group of nine subjects play a median effort game 
or a minimum effort game. Structured pre-play communication helps in achieving and 
                                                             
2 For a more general overview of the effects of communication in experiments we refer the reader to Sally 
(1995), Crawford (1998) and Ostrom (2010). 
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sustaining the efficient equilibrium. Their result suggests that repeated communication 
opportunities allow subjects to more easily coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, as if 
repetitions help subjects negotiate good outcomes. 
Cason and Mui (2010) study a collective resistance game among three players, with finite 
and indefinite repetition. First a leader may “transgress” against one or both of two 
responders, who then may coordinate their individual responses through structured 
communication. They consider both three-subject economies, as well as nine-subject 
economies with random matching. Adding communication facilitates coordination and 
always increases the chance of achieving the efficient outcome.3 
Wilson and Sell (1997) study a finitely repeated voluntary contribution mechanism in 
fixed groups of six participants. They study the impact that two types of information—cheap 
talk and observation of past actions—have on cooperation. Cheap-talk is not effective in 
enhancing cooperation and the authors suggest that future experiments study institutional 
mechanisms that bind subjects to carry the promises made via pre-play communication. 
Duffy and Feltovich (2006) study cooperation in three classes of finitely repeated games: 
prisoner’s dilemma, stag-hunt and chicken. Each economy lasts ten periods and includes 
twenty participants who play against changing opponents. They compare the impact of cheap 
talk and of observation of past actions. There are negative returns in terms of social welfare 
from adding one information technology, if another one is already present. In other words, 
the two information technologies are not complementary in their experiments. 
Cooper and Kuhn (2010) study collusion in two-periods Bertrand duopoly games, with 
structured or free-form messages. In the first period the two subjects can send structured 
messages to each other before playing a social dilemma. In the second period, they play a 
                                                             
3 There are other interesting recent studies on communication, such as Bochet et al. (2006), which studies 
different forms of communication in a public good game, and Bigoni, et al. (2009), which studies 
communication with indefinitely repeated interactions.  
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coordination game. This second period is interpreted as the reduced-form of a continuation 
game with an infinite horizon. Structured communication does not raise cooperation but free-
form communication does. They put forward three reasons for this effect of free-form 
communication: subjects (i) formulate explicit threats to punish cheating, (ii) exchange 
promises to cooperate, and (iii) invoke the mutual benefit of cooperation. Additionally, 
Cooper and Kuhn (2010) study the impact of renegotiation, by comparing economies with 
communication in both periods as opposed only to the first. Theory suggests that the 
possibility to renegotiate lowers the initial incentives to coordinate on cooperation – or 
collude (Abreu et al., 1993, Van Damme, 1989). Contrary to this prediction, cooperation is 
higher when communication occurs in both periods.4 
Our paper differs from the above because it studies an indefinitely repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma in economies of four subjects who have repeated opportunities to communicate, and 
have also incentives to send deceptive messages. Unlike the indefinitely repeated game in 
Cason and Mui (2010), where only a subset of players can exchange messages, our 
communication game is symmetric. Unlike the finitely repeated games in Wilson and Sell 
(1997) and in Duffy and Feltovich (2006), the efficient outcome is a theoretical equilibrium 
in our experimental economies. In Cooper and Kuhn (2010), the reduced-form adopted 
implies subjects act as if they are committing to strategies in the continuation game. Instead, 
our design explicitly encompasses indefinite duration; this allows subjects to choose from a 
much wider set of strategies and retains the fundamental coordination difficulties that 
characterize the continuation game in indefinitely repeated social dilemmas. In addition, 
                                                             
4 In this sense, our study also contributes to a literature on collusion and renegotiation in industrial organization, 
as cooperation in our setup can be seen as a form of collusion. Renegotiation in our paper takes place in a 
stationary environment, because it always involves the same type of game, which is not a pure coordination 
game.  We do not find evidence for a negative impact of renegotiation. Andresson and Wengstrom (2010) also 
investigate the effects of renegotiation and report that, in a two-stage game, pre-play communication only has a 
significant impact on subjects' cooperation when no renegotiation is possible, which is consistent with some of 
our results.  
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subjects cannot send a private message to their opponent before play but can only send a 
public message of proposed play to the entire economy. After observing all messages in the 
economy subjects randomly meet their opponent to play the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Differences with previous experimental studies about repeated social dilemmas also 
emerges with respect to the use of deception. 
There are additional elements of the design, which differentiate our study from previous 
papers on the subject. First, the Pareto efficient outcome in our study is an equilibrium but 
players may use communication deceptively because their interests are not perfectly aligned. 
This contrasts with deception in finitely repeated social dilemmas, where the unique 
equilibrium is defection. Second, our design incorporates a structured communication 
protocol that includes both a common language suggestive of actions (explicit messages), as 
well as language that is not suggestive of actions (neutral messages). This helps in detecting 
and in quantifying a deceptive use of communication. Third, our design introduces a 
mechanism to study whether the ability to make binding promises enhances the effectiveness 
of communication in achieving superior outcomes. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Theoretical Considerations 
There are five treatments that differ in the availability and characteristics of the 
communication means available. The treatments are No-communication, Messages, Multiple 
Messages, Pledge, and Chat (Table 2). Stage game, continuation probability, and matching 
protocols were identical across treatments. In particular, the efficient outcome is a sequential 
equilibrium in all treatments. We first present the No-communication treatment. The other 
treatments, which will be later described, include an additional communication stage. 
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The stage game is a standard prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs determined according to 
Table 1. In the instructions and in the experiment we adopted the neutral labels Y for 
cooperate and Z for defect. 
 
Player 1, 
Player 2 
Y (cooperate) Z (defect) 
Y (cooperate) 25, 25 5, 30 
Z (defect) 30, 5 10, 10 
Table 1: The stage game 
A supergame or cycle (as it was called in the experiment) consists of an indefinite 
interaction among subjects achieved by a random continuation rule in the footsteps of Roth 
and Murninghan (1978). A cycle that has reached period t continues into period t+1 with 
probability δ = 0.95, so the interaction is of finite but uncertain duration. The continuation 
probability δ is interpreted as the discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. The expected 
duration of a cycle is 1/(1-)=20 periods, and in each period the cycle is expected to go on for 
19 additional periods. In the experiment at the end of each period the computer drew a 
random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution, and showed it to all session 
participants. The cycle terminated with a draw of 96 or of a higher number. 
Before taking an action, subjects could observe all past actions taken in their economy, 
but could not see individual histories. A table on the screen listed everyone’s actions in 
random order, period by period. Subjects could identify neither their current nor their past 
opponents. That is to say, subjects could not use strategies based on reputation. However, the 
parameterization selected guarantees that the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium in 
all treatments because subjects can use the threat of economy-wide defection to police 
deviations from cooperation. For a proof of this claim and further details we refer the reader 
to the analysis in the anonymous public monitoring treatment in Camera and Casari (2009). 
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Each experimental session involved twenty subjects and five cycles. We built twenty-five 
economies in each session by creating five groups of four subjects in each of the five cycles. 
This protocol repeatedly exposes subjects to the same decisional situation, hence it allows for 
learning while keeping under control contagion effects across cycles. In every cycle each 
economy included only subjects who had neither been part of the same economy in previous 
cycles nor were part of the same economy in subsequent cycles. Subjects did not know how 
groups were created but were informed that no two participants ever interacted together for 
more than one cycle. This matching protocol across cycles is important to minimize the 
possibility of contagion effects. In our study each subject played five cycles so that subjects 
may have indirectly shared a common past opponent only after the second cycle.  
For the whole duration of a cycle subjects were randomly matched in pairs in each period 
and interacted exclusively with the other three members of their economy. At the beginning 
of each period of the cycle, the economy was randomly divided into two pairs in such a way 
that each subject had one third probability of meeting any of the three other participants in 
her economy. By design, cycles for all economies terminated simultaneously. 
All 180 subjects were recruited through e-mail and in-class-announcements. The sessions 
were run at Purdue University’s VSEEL lab. No eye contact was possible among subjects. 
Instructions were read aloud with copies on all desks. A copy of the instructions is in the 
Appendix. Average earnings were $23.90 and there were no show-up fees. A session lasted 
on average 88 periods for a running time of about 3 hours, including instruction reading and a 
quiz. Each session had 20 participants and 5 cycles. 
3.1 Treatments 
 In treatments Messages, Multiple Messages, Pledge and Chat, subjects had the 
opportunity of sending a public message. We allowed subjects to communicate in the first 
period of the cycle and then also during the course of the cycle. In this manner 
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communication not only can have the role of signalling intention but can also have a 
reassuring role (see the discussion in Crawford, 1998). Messages were simultaneously made 
public and in some treatments repeated rounds of communication occurred before playing the 
stage game (Table 2). This was done because previous results suggest that repeated rounds of 
communication help subjects achieve a consensus on messages (Blume and Ortmann, 2007). 
In all treatments, interactions and communication were anonymous. Communication was 
free-form in the Chat treatment; it was structured in all other treatments, as described below. 
 
 No-
communication 
Messages Multiple 
Messages 
Pledge Chat 
Communication 
frequency n/a Every period 
Every 4 
periods Every 4 periods 
Every 4 
periods 
Message space n/a “Y”, “Z,” or “not sure” 
4 iterations of 
“Y”, “Z,” or 
“not sure” 
“Y”, “Z” or 
“not sure” 
Free-
form text 
Auditing n/a n/a n/a 
Pay 1 point to 
deduct 10 
points from 
anyone whose 
choice & 
suggestion 
differ 
n/a 
Session dates 27.4.05 1.9.05 15.2.07 28.4.10 9.2.07 23.4.10 5.4.07 11.4.07 23.2.07 
No. of periods 129 125 109 42 35 39 75 79 159 
Table 2: Treatments and Sessions 
Notes to Table 2: The sessions run on 27.4.05 and 1.9.05 are also analyzed in Camera and Casari (2009) 
 
Messages treatment. In every period there was a pre-play communication stage, called the 
“suggestions stage” in the instructions. Each subject had the opportunity to suggest a play 
(“Y,” “Z,” or “not sure”) for everyone in the economy for the current period, by making a 
message public, at no cost. A message included three parts: a suggestion (“Y,” “Z,” or “not 
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sure”) for the subject herself, for her anonymous match, and for everyone else.5 Subjects 
were informed that the suggestion stage gave them the opportunity to suggest choice Y or Z 
for themselves, for their match, and for everyone else in their economy. If subjects wanted to 
avoid sending a specific suggestion Y or Z, then they could leave all options to “not sure,” 
which was the default message. Because the mapping between a “Y” or “Z” message and the 
corresponding actions is clear, we refer to those as explicit messages. Instead, we refer to 
“Not sure” as a neutral message, to which different subjects could attach a different meaning. 
When choosing what action to take in the prisoner’s dilemma game, subjects could see on 
their screen everyone’s messages. In keeping with the strict anonymous protocol of the 
experiment, the sender of the message was not identifiable. 
Multiple Messages treatment. Subjects entered the pre-play communication stage at the 
beginning of period one, and then every four periods. To help subjects achieve a consensus 
on the messages and to facilitate coordination on play, in the communication stage each 
subject had repeated opportunities to make a message public, at no cost. The structure of the 
message was as in the Messages treatment, although the communication stage comprised four 
separate steps. In expectation subjects had the same number of opportunities for 
communication as in the Messages treatment, although with a different timing. In step one, 
each subject sent the three-part message described in the Messages treatment (“Y,” “Z,” or 
“not sure”). In step two, first subjects saw on their screen all messages sent in step one by 
everyone in the economy, and then had the opportunity to revise their step-one message. 
Steps three and four followed the same procedure. That is to say, subjects had three separate 
opportunities to revise their message after seeing the messages of others. After their third and 
last revision, subjects could see on their screen all messages by everyone in the economy, 
                                                             
5 We will refer to the first part of the message (message sent “for oneself”) as a message signaling intentions of 
play of the sender; we will refer to the other parts of the message as a message sent to suggest play to others. 
The analysis focuses on the first part of the message, i.e., messages sent “for oneself.” 
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before choosing their action in the Prisoner’s dilemma. Once again, the sender of the message 
was never identifiable during this communication process. 
Pledge treatment. Subjects entered the pre-play communication stage at the beginning of 
period one, and then every four periods. In the communication stage, each subject had one 
opportunity to make a message public, at no cost. The structure of the message and of the 
communication stage was identical to that in the Messages treatment. However, this treatment 
introduced a mechanism that made it possible for messages to be interpreted as binding 
suggestions for future play. This was done as follows. In every period of the cycle, when 
subjects were called to chose between action Y and Z in the Prisoner’s dilemma, subjects 
were also simultaneously asked to decide whether or not to audit, i.e., to verify the 
concordance between messages sent in the last communication stage and the actions chosen 
in the period. If a subject chose to audit, then she paid 1 point in order to activate the auditing 
mechanism for that period. The mechanism would then compare actions and suggestions in 
the entire economy. Through this auditing mechanism, all subjects in the economy (including 
the one who audited) suffered a ten-point loss if in the last communication stage (i) they 
either suggested Y for themselves and chose Z currently, or (ii) they suggested Z for 
themselves and then chose Y. No losses were incurred by subjects who selected the neutral 
message “not sure” for themselves, and by subjects whose choices and suggestions (for 
themselves) were concordant. If at least one person in the economy chose to audit, then at the 
end of the period everyone in the economy could see how many subjects incurred a loss. 
Chat treatment. Subjects entered the pre-play communication stage at the beginning of 
period one, and then every four periods. Communication was free-form and took place 
through a chat box that remained open for two minutes. 6 In sending messages, subjects were 
instructed to be civil to one another, not to use profanities, and not to identify themselves in 
                                                             
6 We thank John Kagel for having kindly provided the chat program. 
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any manner. Each sender of the chat message was identified by a number which changed 
every period, to avoid direct identification of subjects during the communication stage.7  
3.2 Theoretical considerations 
Our design admits multiple equilibria, ranging from full defection to the efficient 
outcome. This follows from the Folk Theorem-type results obtained in the matching games 
studied in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). Given that there is public monitoring of actions 
in the economy, the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium for all 
discount factors greater than 0.25. For risk-neutral agents, the discount factor in the 
experiment corresponds to the continuation probability, i.e., 0.95. The proof is built around 
the conjecture that everyone employs a social norm of cooperation based on the following 
trigger strategy: subjects start period one cooperating and keep cooperating as long they do 
not observe defections. If a defection is observed in the economy, then subjects defect 
forever. See the analysis of anonymous public monitoring in Camera and Casari (2009). 
Several remarks are in order. First, the introduction of structured communication in the 
Messages, Multiple Messages and Pledge treatments, and of free-form communication in the 
Chat treatment does not remove the multiplicity of equilibria that exists in the indefinitely 
repeated game without communication. Indeed, subjects can simply choose to ignore any 
message received. On the one hand, due to public monitoring, the possibility to send public 
messages does not increase the speed with which a defection can be communicated to the rest 
of the economy. On the other hand, public messages can facilitate a reversion to cooperation 
if defections have occurred. 
Second, in contrast to Chat, structured communication imposes important constraints: it 
does not allow conveying individual histories, strategies, approval or disapproval. In 
                                                             
7 The instructions for the chat treatment warned subjects not to identify themselves. Despite this requisite, 
subject could in principle identify themselves indirectly (e.g., by using specific language). 
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particular, with structured communication subjects cannot convey explicit threats for 
defections, which is crucial when incentives to behave opportunistically exist. Hence, despite 
the fact that actions Y and Z are both part of a sequential equilibrium, structured messages are 
not necessarily credible (see the discussion in Farrell and Rabin, 1996). To fix ideas, a subject 
who is following an “always defect” strategy may send a message Y simply to induce her 
opponent to cooperate. That is to say, structured messages are not necessarily self-signaling 
and self-committing and can be outright deceptive. Hence, to quantify the incidence of 
deception through structured communication, our design includes the possibility to send 
messages with a common meaning (an explicit message, reflecting an action label) as well as 
a message without a common meaning (the neutral message “not sure”). 
Third, in the Pledge treatment deception could be eliminated entirely through auditing. 
Subjects had the option to activate an institution ensuring messages are self-committing. If 
someone audited, then the sender of a Y or Z message had a sufficient incentive to behave 
accordingly, because auditing imposed significant losses on those subjects found to have 
behaved inconsistently. Sending a message of cooperation and then defecting gave a subject 
at most 30 points (if the opponent cooperated) minus 10 points of sanction. The active use of 
auditing cannot sustain the efficient outcome because auditing is costly. In addition, in 
equilibrium there is no reason to use auditing as a precautionary measure because it involves 
a personal cost and generates no additional benefits.  
While in theory the Pledge treatment should not reduce the use of deceptive messages, in 
the experiment we expect a positive impact of this institution on cooperation, in light of 
previous experimental results on costly personal punishment. 
 
4. Results 
We report six main results.  
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Result 1: Structured communication did not significantly raise cooperation relative to No-
communication. In contrast, free-form communication supports almost full cooperation.  
 
Figure 1: Cooperation rates by treatment 
Notes to Figure 1: The mean cooperation rate is the fraction of cooperative actions. There is coordination 
on cooperation in a period, when everyone in the economy cooperated. 
 
Figure 1 and Tables 3-4 provide support for Result 1 in reference to average cooperation 
and average coordination on cooperation. The level of cooperation in an economy is the 
fraction of Y actions in that economy. Instead, the level of coordination on cooperation in an 
economy is the fraction of periods in which all subjects in that economy cooperated (Table 
3).8 When comparing average cooperation rates in all periods, the No-communication 
                                                             
8 The mean cooperation rate for economy k=1,..,n is measured by coding a cooperative action as 1, and a 
defection as 0. Define the action aitk{0,1} of subject i=1,..4 in period t=1,..,Tk of the economy k; average 
cooperation in economy k is  kitkk a=c 4T1  between zero and one, and across economies is 
n
=k
kcn
=c
1
1 . 
Thus, although economies have different length Tk, they are given equal weight in our measure c of average 
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treatment is not significantly lower than the Messages, Multiple Messages, and Pledge 
treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that observations from 
the four treatments are drawn from the same population (p-value>0.1, n=200). This result is 
confirmed by pairwise comparisons with the No Communication treatment (Mann-Whitney 
tests, n1=n2=50, p-value>0.10).9 By contrast, the Chat treatment exhibits average 
cooperation rates that are more than 30 percentage points above all other treatments, and this 
difference is significant (Kruskal-Wallis test on the five treatments, n=225, p-value<0.01; 
pairwise Mann-Whitney, n1=25, n2=50, p-value<0.01).10 
Similarly, we fail to find evidence that structured communication significantly increases 
the level of coordination on cooperation with respect to the No Communication treatment 
(Kruskal-Wallis test on four treatments, n=200, p-value>0.1; Mann-Whitney pairwise tests, 
n1=n2=50, p-value>0.10). Furthermore, in the case of the Pledge treatment, coordination on 
cooperation is significantly lower than in any other treatment (Mann-Whitney pairwise tests, 
n1=n2=50, p-value<0.10).  
Treatment 
Coordination 
on defection 
Coordination  
on cooperation 
Miscoordination 
No-communication 0.117 0.286 0.597 
Structured communication 0.109 0.296 0.595 
Table 3: Coordination in an economy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cooperation. Similarly, in economy k the coordination on cooperation rate is 
kT
=t =i
k
itkk aT
=cc
1
4
1
1 , and the 
average across economies is n
=k
kccn
=cc
1
1 . 
9  Unless otherwise stated, in the Result section the unit of observation is an economy in a cycle. The results of 
the statistical tests in the paper rely on the assumption that all observations are independent. All tests are two-
sided. 
10 An independent coder analyzed the chat messages to assess whether subjects in the chat treatment 
communicated contingent strategies. We report that in every economy subjects discussed a plan of action 
directed toward achieving cooperation. However, only in 40% of the economies subjects discussed a possible 
punishment strategy to be implemented in the event of a deviation from the plan of action. This suggests that 
communicating contingent strategies is not essential to achieve 100% cooperation.  
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Notes to Table 3: There is coordination in an economy when all four subjects select the same action in the 
period. The difference among the rates of coordination on defection is not significant (p-value: 0.1046, n1=50, 
n2=150). 
 
More evidence along these lines comes from measuring cooperation through a probit 
regression (Table 4). Regressions in Table 4 include random effects at the subject level and 
cluster at the session level in order to take into account the interactions of choices across 
individual subjects and groups. Table 4 also fails to find evidence that structured 
communication increases cooperation relative to No-communication. 
Dependent variable:  
All treatments, 
All periods 
 
All treatments except 
Chat, Periods 1 only 
All treatments except 
Chat,  
All periods 
1=Cooperation 
0=Defection 
(1a) (1b) 
marginal 
effects 
(2a) (2b) 
marginal 
effects 
(3a) (3b) 
marginal 
effects 
Treatment dummies             
Messages -0.313*** -0.087 0.486* 0.094 -0.255** -0.088 
 (0.087)  (0.259)  (0.106)  
Multiple Messages -0.079 -0.020 0.621*** 0.112 -0.060 -0.020 
 (0.127)  (0.218)  (0.337)  
Pledge -0.803*** -0.264 -0.035 -0.009 -0.301* -0.106 
 (0.171)  (0.233)  (0.157)  
Chat 2.572*** 0.159     
 (0.088)      
N. of others signaling a cooperative  
intention X treatment dummy 
Messages     0.280*** 0.090 
     (0.020)  
Multiple Messages     0.229 0.074 
     (0.173)  
Pledge     0.332*** 0.107 
     (0.023)  
Cycle dummies       
cycle 2 -0.020 -0.005 -0.536** -0.167 0.020 0.007 
 (0.287)  (0.234)  (0.282)  
cycle 3 0.244 0.052 -0.435** -0.131 0.247 0.073 
 (0.164)  (0.202)  (0.152)  
cycle 4 0.242 0.052 -0.130 -0.035 0.391** 0.109 
 (0.207)  (0.248)  (0.199)  
cycle 5 0.399 0.078 -0.000 -0.000 0.494* 0.131 
 (0.268)  (0.255)  (0.285)  
Duration of previous cycle 0.011** 0.003 0.010*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
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Constant 0.787**  0.802**  0.132  
  (0.320)   (0.324)   (0.254)   
Log-likelihood -6377.13  -362.12  -6185.21  
Observations 15840   800   12660   
Table 4: Treatment and communication effects 
Notes to Table 4: Probit regression. The regression includes dummies for periods 2,3,4,5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30 
and above 30, which are not reported in the table. The regression was run with GLLAMM in Stata v.10. 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 
Table 4, column 1 reports the results from a probit regression that explains the individual 
choice to cooperate (1) or not (0) using treatment dummies and other regressors that control 
for fixed effects (cycles, periods within the cycle, duration of the previous cycle). The 
availability of structured communication is associated with a decrease in the cooperation rate 
for the representative subject, which is significant at one percent level in the Pledge and 
Messages treatments and not significant in the Multiple Messages treatment.11  
The novel aspect of Result 1 is that communication is sometimes detrimental to 
cooperation even when cooperation is part of a Nash equilibrium. Theory suggests that, at 
worst, cheap talk communication may be ineffective where messages may not be credible 
(Aumann, 1990). In line with theory, previous empirical evidence on structured 
communication documented that, in coordination games, it generally promotes coordination 
on the Pareto-efficient outcome, especially if the game is repeated (Blume and Ortmann, 
2007). In our experiment repeated communication opportunities did not promote efficient 
Nash play, and sometimes worse outcomes were reached than with no communication. 
Similar findings for structured communication are reported in finitely repeated social 
dilemma experiments where, however, cooperation is not part of a Nash equilibrium (Wilson 
and Sell, 1997, Duffy and Feltovich, 2006). 
                                                             
11 The difference in cooperation rates between No-communication and Messages is significant according to the 
probit regression in Table 4 (col.1) but not according to the above non-parametric test. While in the regression 
one observation is a single choice by a subject in a period, in the test it is the average choice in an economy. As 
a consequence, the regression gives more weights to longer cycles. 
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Result 2: The possibility of renegotiation did not significantly reduce initial cooperation. 
Periodic opportunities to communicate offer the possibility to re-coordinate on cooperation 
after a failed attempt (“renegotiate”). This would not be the case if communication could take 
place only once at the beginning of the cycle. The possibility of renegotiation weakens the 
credibility of punishment threats for deviation from a cooperative strategy. Hence, theory 
predicts lower initial cooperation rates in treatments with communication than without (e.g., 
VanDamme, 1989, Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti, 1993). 
Cooperation in period 1 was 70.5% in No-communication, 78.0% in Messages, 76.5% in 
Multiple Messages, 65.0% in Pledge, 100.0% in Chat. A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the 
hypothesis that observations from the first four treatments are drawn from the same 
distribution (n=200, p-value: 0.06). Initial cooperation rates in Pledge are significantly lower 
than in Messages and Multiple-messages (Mann-Whitney tests, n1=n2=50, p-values: 0.016 
and 0.04, respectively). 
Table 4, column 2 provides further supports for Result 2. Results from a probit regression 
explaining the individual choices in period 1 always highlight no significant decrease in 
initial cooperation, and a significant increase in some treatments. This does not support the 
conjecture that the possibility to renegotiate lowers initial cooperation rates. Result 2 answers 
a methodological question raised in Cooper and Kuhn (2010) about the possibility of 
studying collusion in finitely repeated games to draw inference on infinitely repeated games. 
We report that some of their main results on the effects of communication still hold in an 
indefinitely repeated setting. In particular, we confirm that the possibility of renegotiation is 
not detrimental to cooperation, as opposed to a no-communication setting. 
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Result 3: Structured messages signaled intentions: subjects tended to act in accordance with 
their own messages. Moreover, subjects’ choices were affected by others’ messages. 
Table 5 and Figure 2 provide support for Result 3. Subjects seized on communication 
opportunities when available, by widely sending public messages that explicitly stated their 
intended play (i.e., a message Y or Z, for structured communication). In particular, with 
structured communication, subjects rarely made public statements of defection. 
The opportunity to send an explicit public message is used between 36.6% and 88.0% of 
instances, depending on the treatment, as seen in Figure 2, which illustrates the fraction of 
‘not sure’ messages. Messages of defection in the structured communication treatments 
amount to less than 5.1% of the instances in which communication could take place 
(154/3020 for Messages, 20/440 for Multiple Messages and 41/860 for Pledge, Table 5). 
In all treatments, there is coherence at the individual level between the statements made 
public and choices subsequently taken. Recall that there is no direct cost from choosing an 
action different from the message sent. Only in the Pledge treatment the chance of being 
audited introduces such a cost as an endogenous possibility. 
In the Messages treatment, while a subject who publicly signaled her intention to 
cooperate (message “Y”) did cooperate in 64.1% of periods immediately following 
communication, a subject who signaled defection (message “Z”) cooperated only in 7.1% of 
cases (Table 5). In the Multiple Messages and Pledge treatments there is an even stronger 
coherence between messages sent and subsequent choices. As a consequence, subjects could 
rely on public statements made by others about their intended play to forecast behavior in the 
economy. Our data show that actions are a function of the type of messages seen. 
Table 5 shows that a subject cooperated more frequently the greater was the number of 
cooperative messages observed. For example, in the Messages treatment, a subject who sent a 
neutral message (“not sure”) cooperated in 62.0% of cases when everyone else sent a 
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cooperation message and 40.1% in all other instances. Subjects that made public a neutral 
statement cooperated less than the economy average. We will say that a message is 
informative if it is positively or negatively correlated with a specific action. 
 
Cooperation frequency conditional on the 
messages sent by others Subject’s message about 
her intended play 
Cooperation  
frequency zero, one, or two 
 Y messages 
Three 
Y messages 
Messages   
Not sure 0.449 0.401 (800) 0.620 (221) 
Y (cooperation) 0.641 0.577(1273) 0.783 (572) 
Z (defection) 0.071 0.058(120) 0.118 (34) 
Total 0.547 0.484(2193) 0.712 (827) 
    
Multiple Messages    
Not sure 0.547 0.524 (21) 0.563 (32) 
Y (cooperation) 0.752 0.730 (159) 0.769 (208) 
Z (defection) 0.150 0.125 (8)  0.167 (12) 
Total 0.700 0.681 (188) 0.714 (252) 
    
Pledge    
Not sure 0.369 0.368 (527) 0.389 (18) 
Y (cooperation) 0.887 0.876 (250) 1.000 (24) 
Z (defection) 0.049 0.025 (40) 1.000 (1) 
Total 0.519 0.507 (817) 0.744 (43) 
    
Table 5: Communication as a signal of intentions 
 
Notes to Table 5: this table only considers (i) messages sent by the subject about her intended play and (ii) the 
concordance between the message and the subject’s the action immediately following the message. Number of 
observations is in parenthesis. 
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   The probit regression in Table 4, column 3 interacts the treatment dummies with a variable 
measuring the number of cooperative messages sent by other subjects in the period. Results 
confirm that the greater is the number of cooperative messages observed, the higher is the 
cooperation rate for the representative subject. In addition, the regression shows that the lack 
of messages signaling the intention to cooperate was taken as a signal of the intention to 
defect. If others did not make public their intention to cooperate, then cooperation was lower 
in treatments with structured communication than the treatment without communication. This 
finding supports the interpretation that sending a public message of cooperation was 
perceived as signaling truthfully the intention of the sender. 
All this evidence suggests that the lack of public messages of cooperation was interpreted 
as a lukewarm desire to coordinate on cooperation, whereas the presence of cooperative 
messages was interpreted as a strong desire for coordination on cooperation. This explains 
why high levels of cooperation are observed when many cooperative messages are made 
public, and low levels of cooperation emerge otherwise. 
 
Figure 2: Neutral messages 
 
23 
 
Notes to Figure 2: One observation is a message of the subject’s intended play for the period. In period one, 
N=200 for each line. Cycle length reported was truncated after period 21 due to the low number of observations 
for periods after 21 in some treatments. The number of observations in period 21 is reported at the end of the 
line. 
 
Result 4: Subjects used structured communication for two opposite goals: either to 
coordinate on cooperation or to capture short-run rents through deception.  
Because in the experiment messages were informative, they shaped beliefs. From Result 3, 
one can conjecture that the more cooperative messages were made public, the stronger was 
the belief that a social norm of cooperation could be supported. This means that subjects 
could make several uses of communication. The socially desirable, or benevolent, use of 
communication is to help coordination on cooperation by reinforcing the belief that the 
sender of a cooperative message will cooperate. However, there is also a socially undesirable 
use of communication. Subjects could behave deceptively by sending a cooperative message 
to reinforce the belief in a cooperative outcome while intending to defect.   
The data provide evidence on these conflicting uses of public messages. Based on the 
messages sent and observed, in the data there exist cases in which one can quantify a lower 
bound for the incidence of deceptive and benevolent use of communication in the experiment. 
For this purpose, we define two types of subjects. A deceptive subject is someone who, at 
least once during the cycle, signaled her intention to cooperate, observed that everyone else 
also shared a similar intention, and defected the period immediately following such 
communication. A benevolent subject either cooperated in all those periods of a cycle when 
all other subjects signaled the intention to cooperate; or cooperated in all periods of a cycle 
when she made public her intention to cooperate. Clearly, not all subjects fall into one of 
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these two types because either subjects behaved differently or never faced a situation in 
which they could behave deceptively or benevolently.12  
The prevalent use of communication in all treatments is benevolent. In the Messages 
treatment 41.9% of subjects were deceptive and 49.5% were benevolent when given the 
opportunity (no.obs. 52/124, 95/192, respectively);  in the Multiple Message treatment 27.7% 
were deceptive and 68.0% were benevolent (31/112, 134/197); in the Pledge treatment 0.0% 
were deceptive and 77.8% were benevolent (0/4, 88/113).  
This finding suggests that what prevented structured communication from facilitating the 
implementation of a social norm of cooperation is not entirely explained by limitations in the 
message space. As we have seen messages are empirically informative and not necessarily 
theoretically credible. The crux of the matter is that there were subjects who made a 
deceptive use of communication. Deception diluted the meaningfulness of the observed 
public messages of cooperation, and reduced the value of making public the intention to 
cooperate. 
Table 6 provides further support for Result 4. In a probit regression, we explain the 
cooperation actions (0=defect, 1=cooperate) using as independent variables the messages 
made public in the economy, controlling for period effects, cycle order and duration. Subjects 
were not always more likely to cooperate when they observed several cooperative messages. 
A subject who sent a cooperative message was more likely to cooperate when two or three 
others signaled their intention to cooperate, and the effect was highly significant in all three 
treatments. This supports the view that communication was used to foster coordination on a 
                                                             
12 Our definition aims to pin down a lower bound for deceptive behavior. For example, someone who sends a 
cooperative message, then observes two others who sent a cooperative message and one who sent a defection 
message is not classified as being deceptive even if she defects in the following period. Similarly, we cannot say 
whether a subject is benevolent if she never sent a cooperative message and she never observed three 
cooperative messages from the others. Hence, we have fewer than 200 observations per treatment that we can 
use to classify subjects as deceptive or benevolent type. 
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social norm of cooperation. On the other hand, subjects who did not send a cooperative 
message, and also observed at least two cooperative messages were less likely to cooperate in 
the Messages and Multiple Messages treatments. This is evidence that some subjects used 
communication in an opportunistic way.  
  
Dependent variable: cooperation  
marginal effects from probit regressions Messages 
Multiple 
Messages Pledge 
msg_sent (=1 if the subject signaled the intention 
to cooperate) 0.071 -0.398*** 0.558*** 
 (0.170) (0.091) (0.043) 
msg_observed (=1 if the subject observed  2 or 3 
cooperative messages) -0.093*** -0.365*** 0.088* 
 (0.031) (0.064) (0.047) 
(msg_sent.) x (msg_observed) 0.333*** 0.704*** 0.313*** 
 (0.067) (0.134) (0.035) 
cycle 2 -0.308*** -0.106 -0.135* 
 (0.003) (0.166) (0.072) 
cycle 3 0.047** -0.115* 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.062) (0.007) 
cycle 4 0.045 -0.125** -0.221** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.105) 
cycle 5 -0.044 -0.156*** 0.028*** 
 (0.040) (0.017) (0.005) 
lagduration -0.018* 0.004 -0.004** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) 
communication (1 in periods 1, 5, 9,..)  0.078* 0.087** 
  (0.042) (0.040) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.292 0.112 0.335 
Observations 2820 1280 2880 
Table 6: Effect of signaling cooperative intentions on cooperation 
Notes to Table 6: We regress the binary choice of cooperation/defection on three main regressors, as well as 
standard control variables (duration of the previous cycle, cycle and period dummies, individual fixed effects, 
and a dummy for periods in which communication was possible). The first regressor is a dummy that takes value 
1 when the subject signaled her intention to cooperate (i.e., sent a message Y “for herself”). The second 
regressor is also a dummy, which takes value 1 in periods when communication was possible and the subject 
observed at least two cooperative messages from others. The third regressor is an interaction term between the 
first two. Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Individual fixed effects.  
 
The regression also provides evidence that the possibility to audit the consistency between 
actions and messages removed the incentives to make a deceptive use of communication 
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opportunities and effectively introduced the possibility of individual commitment as a way to 
build trust. In the Pledge treatment, subjects who signaled a cooperative intention were 
significantly more likely to cooperate even when no one else publicly signaled their intention 
to cooperate. Moreover, subjects who did not signal their intention to cooperate, also raised 
their cooperation level when they observed cooperative messages, albeit to a lesser extent due 
to the presence of opportunistic subjects. 
Finally, the regression provides support for the view that neutral messages “not sure” had 
a negative connotation. In the Multiple Messages treatment, subjects who publicly signaled a 
cooperative intention and saw that less than two other subjects did the same, were less likely 
to cooperate than subjects who did not send a cooperative message. We know also that very 
few subjects sent explicit signals of defection (message Z). 
 
Result 5: In the Pledge treatment, there was no deceptive use of communication thanks to the 
extensive use of auditing. Defectors paid to audit more often than cooperators. 
The Pledge treatment substantially altered communication patterns. It increased the 
information content of communication (Result 3). The opportunity to audit transformed 
structured communication from cheap-talk into a form of public and unilateral commitment 
device, i.e., a credible pledge. A subject who sent a message signaling a cooperative 
intention, and then defected, suffered a loss if someone in the economy audited.  As a 
consequence, the use of auditing removed the incentives to use communication deceptively, 
but it also exposed subjects who publicly “pledged” cooperation to the risk of being exploited 
by those uninterested in coordinating on the efficient outcome. Sending a public message of 
cooperation could be particularly risky because the pledge lasted for four periods. As a result, 
deception disappeared because of lack of cooperative pledges: a large fraction of explicit 
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messages were simply replaced by neutral messages (Figure 2). The net effect was that 
coordination on cooperation declined relative to the no-communication treatment (Table 4). 
On average, someone audited in 44.6% of periods, which is evidence that subjects desired 
to have a commitment technology. Paying one point to audit can be seen as an investment 
aimed at ensuring that those who signaled a cooperative intention were indeed committed to 
cooperation. As a result the truthfulness of messages increased in the Pledge treatment. A 
subject who signal a cooperative intention cooperated more frequently than in other 
treatments (Table 5). However, commitment could be used in one of two ways. To facilitate 
coordination on cooperation by assuring that others would also cooperate, i.e., by building 
trust that others are committed to cooperation. Or to facilitate rent extraction, which instead 
reduces trust in the cooperative efforts of others.13 Table 7 provides evidence for both uses of 
auditing. Cooperators who sent a cooperative message were responsible for 33.9% of auditing 
requests while defectors who sent a neutral message were responsible for 46.2% of auditing 
requests. This evidence supports the view that introducing a mechanism to transform public 
statements into binding promises did not make it easier to implement a social norm of 
cooperation. Through auditing cooperators were simply kept hostage by defectors.  
 
 Subject’s message about her intended play 
Action chosen Not sure Y (cooperation) Z (defection) 
Total N 
 % % % %  
Y (cooperation) 11.1 33.9 0.2 45.3 191 
Z (defection) 46.2 4.0 4.5 54.7 231 
                                                             
13 To fix ideas, consider an economy where one subject sent a neutral message and then defected after observing 
three cooperative messages. Those who sent a cooperative message could not profit from defecting if auditing 
takes place, because they would lose 5 points in expectation. Notice that the defector has an incentive to audit: 
she will earn 30 minus 1 point instead of a maximum of 25. Cooperators who sent a cooperative message have 
an incentive to audit when everyone else sends a cooperative message, because doing so removes the incentives 
to be deceptive. 
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Total 57.3 37.9 4.7 100.0 422 
N 242 160 20 422  
Table 7: Auditing in the Pledge treatment  
Notes to Table 7: one observation per subject per period. The table reports the distribution of auditing choices 
in the population according to the signal made public by the subject (message sent “for onself”) and the action 
subsequently chosen. The 422 instances of requests for auditing amounts to 100% of the observations in the 
table. 
 
Result 6: Signaling intentions through structured communication did not have positive 
impact on profits in the economy.  
Evidence for Result 6 is given by the regressions in Table 8. We regress the average profit in 
each economy on the average number of public statements that were explicit about the 
sender’s intended play (“Y” or “Z” messages “for oneself”), controlling for cycle order and 
length.  
Dependent variable: 
Average profit per economy 
Messages 
(1) 
Multiple Messages  
(2) 
Pledge 
(3) 
Number of explicit messages 
regarding the subject’s intended 
play 
 
3.514 
(1.560) 
0.689 
(0.885) 
-0.189** 
(0.009) 
Number of explicit messages 
regarding play suggested to 
others (match and everyone else) 
-2.165 
(2.205) 
1.111 
(2.470) 
1.876*** 
(0.002) 
    
Cycle 2 -2.927 -0.295 -2.847 
 (0.689) (1.632) (0.849) 
Cycle 3 1.537 -0.831 -2.760** 
 (3.408) (0.176) (0.108) 
Cycle 4 0.675 -0.615 -1.053* 
 (1.839) (0.946) (0.090) 
Cycle 5 -0.536 -1.326* -2.275** 
 (1.450) (0.105) (0.092) 
Cycle length in periods   -0.145** -0.262* -0.125*** 
 (0.007) (0.037) (0.000) 
Constant 17.577* 16.494 17.752** 
 (2.185) (5.257) (0.281) 
Observations 50 50 50 
R2 0.317 0.142 0.342 
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Table 8: Structured communication and profits 
Notes to Table 8: OLS regression where the dependent variable is profits. For the Pledge treatment the 
dependent variable is gross profits, i.e., fees and costs associated to auditing are not removed from the total. 
Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
In the Pledge treatment there was a significantly negative association between the number 
of messages signaling intentions and the profit in the economy. Moreover, there was a 
positive association between the message sent to suggest play to others and the profit in the 
economy. None of these effects is significant in the Messages and Multiple Messages 
treatments. These findings suggest that making binding promises of play did not help to 
increase profits because of the exploitative use of auditing made by defectors; instead, 
subjects relied on a more indirect way to signal their cooperative intention by using non-
binding promises, i.e., by suggesting the cooperative action to others. Contrary to the 
conjecture in Wilson and Sell (1997), augmenting a public communication technology in 
such a way that a message effectively amounts to a strong pledge, is not helpful in improving 
aggregate welfare in repeated social dilemmas. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The experimental literature has demonstrated that pre-play communication promotes 
social efficiency in a variety of settings, even when the socially efficient outcome is not a 
Nash equilibrium. One would expect cheap-talk to have a similar or even more beneficial 
impact in settings where the socially efficient outcome is a theoretical equilibrium, albeit one 
that is empirically infrequently observed (Camera and Casari, 2009). 
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We have studied if communication could help to implement social norms of cooperation 
in a stable population of subjects who interacted with changing opponents. Through an 
experiment we studied five distinct communication technologies: no communication, chat, 
and different types of structured communication. With each technology, a subject initially 
sent a message to everyone in the economy, observed everyone’s messages, and then 
randomly met an opponent to play a prisoner’s dilemma. Subjects could observe past 
cooperation rates in the economy but not individual histories, so reputation could not be built. 
This design resembles the anonymous and impersonal interaction that takes place in large 
societies. Because the interaction was indefinitely repeated, all treatments admitted multiple 
equilibria, including the efficient outcome. Subjects could sustain the efficient outcome 
through a social norm of cooperation based on community enforcement of defections. We 
report that only free-form communication was effective in raising cooperation. With 
structured communication, subjects tended to act in accordance with their own message, and 
to react to the messages seen. Yet, structured communication did not significantly increase 
cooperation relative to no communication. This is especially surprising because in the 
experiment subjects interacted anonymously and could not develop a reputation. 
This experiment allows us to disentangle some of the elements that do or do not make 
communication effective in raising social welfare. In particular, the design allows us to assess 
the impact of different roles of public statements: for coordination, for commitment, and for 
deception. We report that deceptive and benevolent uses of communication coexisted.  Most 
subjects valued the coordination and commitment roles of communication. However, 
different subjects used communication for different purposes. In particular, with structured 
communication a minority of subjects behaved deceptively, which undermined trust and 
rendered communication ineffective in raising social welfare. 
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As in most papers with structured communication, the experiment includes a treatment in 
which subjects simultaneously send a message before choosing their action (Messages 
treatment). However, we also study the case when subjects can revise multiple times their 
public message after observing the messages of everyone else and before deciding on their 
action (Multiple Messages treatment). Given the underlying uncertainty about others’ 
strategies, having the opportunity to revise messages to achieve consensus should foster the 
emergence of a social norm of cooperation. If communication is primarily used to facilitate 
coordination on the efficient outcome, then we would expect higher cooperation rates in 
Multiple Messages than in Messages. On the contrary, we report that cooperation rates in the 
two treatments did not differ. 
Talk being cheap, it is perhaps the credibility of messages that makes communication 
ineffective in raising cooperation rates. In the Pledge treatment subjects could solve 
credibility problems. Through auditing, anyone could verify the concordance of messages 
sent with actions subsequently taken. If auditing occurred, then those who broke their pledge 
were sanctioned. Auditing introduced the possibility of voluntary individual commitment. If 
making binding promises public is valuable to build trust, then one would expect a higher 
cooperation rate in the Pledge than in the Messages treatment. On the contrary, we report that 
cooperation significantly fell.  
With our design we can also detect whether the use of communication is benevolent or 
deceptive, and quantify the relative incidence. Deception, i.e., falsely signaling intentions, 
can be the reason why structured communication is ineffective. We report that the prevalent 
use of communication was benevolent, but there was also a substantial use of deception, 
especially in the Messages treatment where around 42% of subjects sent at least one 
deceptive message. The possibility to make a pledge eliminated deception, but it did so at the 
expense of crowding-out explicit communication. In the Pledge treatment explicit messages 
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were much more informative because a subject’s pledge to cooperate was fulfilled 89% of the 
times. However this also reduced the volume of explicit messages because subjects who 
pledged cooperation were easy targets for opportunistic defectors. Hence, subjects switched 
to sending neutral messages. Moreover, sending a binding public message amounted to being 
the first mover in a game, which lowered the usefulness of communication, as the sender of 
the message could not react to the messages later observed. In sum, contrary to the conjecture 
in Wilson and Sell (1997), the experimental results suggest that binding promises are not the 
key to increase the effectiveness of communication in sustaining cooperation. The above 
findings suggest that what prevents structured communication from facilitating full efficiency 
is not so much the limitation in the message space or difficulties in interpreting messages. To 
be effective, the communication technology should support a high volume of messages, while 
reducing the incentive for deception. None of our structured communication technologies 
exhibited both of these properties.  
Our findings for structured communication mirror some of the results obtained in finitely 
repeated social dilemmas, where cheap-talk can have no impact or even a negative impact on 
social welfare (Wilson and Sell, 1997, Duffy and Feltovich, 2006). This suggests that the 
same behavioral mechanism tied to communication in finitely repeated games–where only 
defection is an equilibrium–is also present when the game is indefinitely repeated, where 
cooperation is also an equilibrium. In a way, it is surprising that the behavioral impact of 
structured communication is unaffected by the change in equilibrium set, especially because 
of the associated introduction of a non-trivial coordination problem. Only in the chat 
treatment communication played a positive role. Perhaps the possibility to convey strategies 
and verbally punish defectors helped the implementation of a social norm of cooperation. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
treatments n1 n2 p-value 
No-communication vs. Messages 50 50 0.4984 
No-communication vs. Multiple Messages 50 50 0.1096 
No-communication vs. Pledge 50 50 0.9780 
No-communication vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Messages vs. Multiple Messages 50 50 0.4095 
Messages.vs. Pledge 50 50 0.3246 
Messages.vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Multiple Messages vs. Pledge 50 50 0.0604 
Multiple Messages vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Pledge. vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Table A1: rank-sum tests across treatments - cooperation (individual decision) 
 
 
treatments  n1  n2  p-value 
No-communication vs. Messages 50 50 0.5222 
No-communication vs. Multiple Messages 50 50 0.8221 
No-communication vs. Pledge 50 50 0.0763 
No-communication vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Messages vs. Multiple Messages 50 50 0.7563 
Messages vs. Pledge 50 50 0.0238 
Messages vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Multiple Messages vs. Pledge 50 50 0.0901 
Multiple Messages vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Pledge. vs. Chat 50 25 0.0000 
Table A2: rank-sum tests across treatments - coordination on cooperation 
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subject's messages Number of cooperative messages by others  
self|match|else 0 1 2 3 Total N 
N.S N.S. N.S. 45.3% 44.9% 35.5% 62.8% 45.9% 988 
N.S. Coop. Coop. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12 
Coop. N.S. N.S. 75.0% 72.7% 93.3% 92.9% 90.7% 118 
Coop. Coop. N.S. 0.0% 9.5% 42.7% 42.9% 31.3% 182 
Coop. Coop. Coop. 44.8% 43.5% 71.8% 80.6% 67.0% 1510 
Defect Coop. N.S. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5 
Defect Defect Coop.  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6 
all other messages 5.9% 9.4% 11.4% 17.9% 11.6% 199 
Total 39.9% 39.2% 56.7% 71.2% 54.7% 3020 
N 286 760 1147 827 3020  
Table A3: truthfulness of subjects' messages - treatment Messages 
 
N.S.= not sure Y=cooperate Z=defect 
 
subject’s messages Number of cooperative messages by others  
self|match|else 0 1 2 3 Total N 
N.S. N.S. N.S.  66.7% 50.0% 54.8% 53.8% 52 
Coop. N.S. N.S.    100.0% 100.0% 3 
Coop. Coop. N.S.  50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 33.3% 9 
Coop. Coop. Coop. 100.0% 54.5% 77.7% 77.8% 76.4% 351 
Defect Coop. N.S.   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
Defect Defect Coop.   100.0%  100.0% 1 
all other messages   0.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20 
Total 100.0% 55.2% 70.3% 71.4% 70.0% 440 
N 1 29 158 252 440  
Table A4: truthfulness of subjects' messages - treatment Multiple Messages 
 
 
subject's messages Number of cooperative messages by others  
self|match|else 0 1 2 3 Total N 
N.S. N.S. N.S. 22.6% 27.8% 41.4% 50.0% 29.1% 296 
N.S. Coop. Coop. 36.6% 54.1% 45.9% 33.3% 45.4% 205 
Coop. N.S. N.S.  100.0%   100.0% 1 
Coop. Coop. N.S. 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 73.7% 19 
Coop. Coop. Coop. 85.5% 90.3% 96.1% 100.0% 90.7% 248 
Defect Coop. N.S. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 10 
all other messages 9.7% 50.0% 36.4% 100.0% 33.3% 81 
Total 40.9% 54.6% 59.3% 74.4% 51.9% 860 
N 291 359 167 43 860  
Table A5: truthfulness of subjects' messages - treatment Pledge 
 
 
treatments 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
3 
 
No-communication   24 19 47 25 14 129 
 13 11 7 41 53 125 
Messages 20 23 20 24 22 109 
 2 1 32 5 2 42 
Multiple Messages  1 15 9 4 6 35 
 4 9 3 15 8 39 
Pledge 47 2 10 3 13 75 
 3 7 2 42 25 79 
Chat 14 70 40 25 10 159 
Table A6: cycle duration 
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Appendix B: Instructions for treatment Messages (not for publication) 
Overview 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  Purdue University has provided funds for this 
research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you can 
earn an appreciable amount of money. These earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment.  
 We ask that you not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. Please turn off 
your cell-phones. Do not use e-mail. 
During the course of this experiment, you will be called upon to make decisions in several 
periods. The experiment is divided into five sequences of periods and each sequence is referred to as a 
cycle. 
 At the beginning of a cycle, each participant in this room will be randomly assigned 
to a set.  
 
 In each set there will be four persons.  
 
 For the whole duration of a cycle, you will interact exclusively with the three other 
participants in that set and nobody else.  
 
 You will never meet again these participants in the following cycles.  
 
In each period of a cycle: 
 In each period you will be matched to one other participant selected at random from 
the set you are assigned to. We will refer to this person as “your match.” 
 
 You will not be informed of the identity of your match. Hence, you do not know 
when you have already interacted with that person in previous periods of the same 
cycle. 
 
 You and your match will interact according to the rules described in the upper 
portion of your screen. The rules will be explained in a moment. 
 
 After each period you will be re-matched to a participant chosen at random from 
the set you are assigned to. There is one chance out of three that you will be 
matched with any given person in your set. 
 
5 
 
 
Interaction rules 
Each period is divided into two stages. In the suggestion stage everyone will have an 
opportunity to exchange information with others in their set. In the suggestion stage, you do not earn 
any points. In the action stage you interact only with your match and you can earn points. We now 
explain the action stage and later will explain suggestion stage. 
Action stage. You and your match can make either of two choices, Y or Z.  The points you 
earn in the action stage depend upon both the choice you make and the choice made by your match in 
that stage. As the payoff table on your screen (above) indicates, there are four possible outcomes for 
the action stage: 
1. If both of you choose Y then:  you both earn 25 points. 
 
2. If you choose Y and your match chooses Z then:  you earn 5 points and your match earns 30 
points. 
 
3. If you choose Z and your match chooses Y then: you earn 30 points and your match earns 5 
points. 
 
Period 
History of choices of your 
previous matches 
Action stage: you 
don’t know the ID of 
your match 
Your set 
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4. If you both choose Z then:  you both earn 10 points. 
  To make your choice, click the button next to either Y or Z.  You may change your mind at 
any time prior to clicking the “Submit” button by simply clicking on the button next to Y or Z. You 
are free to choose Y or Z in every period.  When you are satisfied with your choice, click the 
“Submit” button.   
 
Suggestion stage. At the beginning of every period, you will have an opportunity to exchange 
suggestions about choices with everyone in your set. You are free to skip the suggestion stage entirely 
by clicking the “No Suggestion” button. The suggestion stage gives you the opportunity to suggest 
choice Y or Z for any person in your set. Your suggestion is shared with all people in your set.   
You can make a suggestion for the current period. Suggestions concern choices for you, for 
your match, and for everyone else in your set. To share your suggestion with others, click the “Submit 
suggestion” button. 
After the suggestion stage, all suggestions from people in your set will be displayed in a table 
in the middle of the screen. In the action stage, you are always free to choose Y or Z regardless of 
suggestions made by you or others. After all persons have made suggestions and choices, the results 
of the period will appear on your screen. 
 
Suggestion stage 
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The result screen (above) will display the number of points you have earned for the period as 
well as the choices of all four persons in your set. The first column of the ‘Summary of Results’ 
table contains your past choices. The second column concerns the choices of your previous matches. 
The third and fourth columns list the choices of the other two persons in your set. Notice that choices 
in the column labeled “Your match” were most likely made by different persons in different 
periods. The same can be said for the two columns labeled “Other person”. Please record your 
results for the period on your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate headings. 
At this stage a ball will be drawn from an urn containing one hundred balls numbered from 1 
to 100. Each ball is equally likely to be selected. The computer program will randomly draw a ball 
and show the number on the result screen (above). If this random number is less than or equal to 95, 
then the cycle will continue into the next period. If this number is greater than 95, then the cycle 
ends.  Therefore, after each period there is a 95% chance that there will be another period of 
interactions in the cycle and a 5% chance that the cycle will end.   
Suppose that a number less than or equal to 95 has been drawn.  Then you press the 
“Continue” button to proceed.  You will face the same decisional situation as in the previous period, 
but with a person selected at random from the set of participants you were assigned to. 
Remember that there are four participants in each set.  
Your results 
Random number 
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Before making your choice, you may review all the outcomes in previous periods of the cycle 
by scrolling down the “Summary of Results” table.  The table shows your past choices and the past 
choices of all persons in your set. You then choose either Y or Z.  All choices for this period are 
recorded and added to the Summary of Results table in the lower portion of your screen.  You then 
record the outcome and your point earnings for the period.  
  
If the number drawn is greater than 95 then the cycle ends. When a cycle ends, you will be 
notified in a new screen. There will be a total of five cycles. The rules in the following cycles are the 
same as in the first, but you will interact with different persons. More precisely, after each cycle, new 
sets of persons will be formed. This assignment does not depend on actual choices. A participant will 
never interact with a person for more than one cycle. 
  
 
Earnings 
  
The points you earned in each period are added up. For every 10 points that you earn you will receive 
13 cents ($.13).  Therefore, the more points you earn the more money you earn. You will be paid your 
earnings in cash and in private at the end of today’s session. 
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Final Comments 
  
First, do not discuss your choices or your results with anyone at any time during the 
experiment.   
  
Second, your ID# is private.  Do not reveal it to anyone. 
  
Third, since there is a 95% chance that at the end of a period the cycle will continue, you can 
expect, on average, to interact for 20 periods in a given cycle.  However, since the stopping decision 
is made randomly, some cycles may be much longer than 20 periods and some others may be much 
shorter. 
  
Fourth, remember that after each period you will be matched randomly to someone in the set 
you were assigned to. As there are four people in the set, the probability of you being matched with 
the same person in two consecutive periods of a cycle is 1/3. You are not told the identity of your 
match. 
 
Fifth, in the suggestion stage of every period you have an opportunity to suggest choices to 
people in your set. In the action stage everyone is free to choose Y or Z independently from any 
suggestion.  
 
Sixth, the rules are the same in all five cycles. After a cycle, you will never meet again the 
same participants. 
  
Questions? 
  
Now is the time for questions.  Does anyone have any questions before we begin? 
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Appendix C: Quiz 
 
QUIZ 
1. The total number of cycles is ________________ 
2. You are at the beginning of the cycle. How many periods do you expect the cycle will last, on 
average? _____________ 
3. You are in period 15 of the cycle. How many additional periods do you expect, on average? 
____________ 
4. The number of participants in the experiment (total in the room)  is________ 
5. In a given cycle with how many participants could you interact with  
(i.e. number of people in a set)?  _________ 
6. In a given period with how many participants do you interact with?  __________ 
7. Other than your match, will you know at the end of the period the actions taken by people in your 
set? _________ 
8. Will you know at the end of the period the actions taken by participants outside your set? 
_________ 
9. Before choosing an action, will you know the ID of your match? _________ 
10. If  ID 5 is in your set this cycle, is there any chance that ID 5 will be your match in future cycles?  
_________ 
11. How many points do you earn if both you and your match choose Y? _________ 
12. If the experiment lasts 100 periods and everybody always chooses Y, how many dollars are you 
going to earn? ___________________ 
13. How many points do you earn if you and your match choose Z? _________ 
14. If the experiment lasts 100 periods and everybody always chooses Z, how many dollars are you  
 
 
